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Jurors are often exposed to gruesome images of plaintiff injuries in civil
cases. We conducted a mock jury experiment to investigate whether
viewing a gruesome image of a plaintiff’s injury would rouse disgust,
which in turn might motivate a biased assessment of other evidence to
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support choosing a liable verdict. Mock jurors read about a plaintiff
who lost his leg in a car accident and was suing the manufacturer of the
guardrail that severed his leg. They were randomly assigned to read
verbal descriptions of the injury, or to read the description and see a
gruesome image of the severed leg. Mock jurors who saw the gruesome
image (versus those who merely read about it) reported feeling more
disgust, which in turn led them to (a) agree more with other plaintiff
evidence that was unrelated to the injury, and (b) agree less with other
defense evidence that was unrelated to the injury. This biased assess-
ment of other evidence, ultimately was related to a greater likelihood of
choosing a liable verdict. The gruesome image did not affect damage
awards. This suggests a potentially prejudicial effect of viewing grue-
some images: they might rouse disgust and motivation to skew jurors’
assessment of other evidence in the case to see someone held accounta-
ble for the injury.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the conventional story that law is reason free from passion,
the courtroom is often a very emotional place. Judges and juries are
not only confronted with emotional appeals from attorneys, victims,
and witnesses, but they are also exposed to evidence that is likely to
arouse intense emotional reactions—including anger, sadness, fear,
sympathy, and disgust. The persuasive power of visual images is often
harnessed by attorneys to connect with jurors’ emotions. Accidents
and assaults are now increasingly captured on video—from surveil-
lance cameras to cell phones—leading to more emotional experiences
for jurors and the need for judges to re-evaluate the admissibility of
this kind of evidence.1 In the past decade, the use of visual evidence
and arguments during legal proceedings has advanced, but empirical
research on the effect that these important tools have on jurors’ deci-
sion-making has just begun.2 In fact, very little of the already small
literature focuses on civil cases. Attorneys are increasingly building
narratives through visual evidence that is likely to heighten jurors’
negative emotions. These forms of evidence offer probative value, but
the accompanying emotional reactions might also pose a threat of un-
fair prejudice.
1. John Schwartz & Katie Zezima, With Video Everywhere, Stark Evidence is on Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec 8, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/us/09jury.html.
2. See Richard Sherwin, Neal Feigenson & Christina Spiesel, What is Visual Knowledge, and
What is it Good for? Potential Ethnographic Lessons from the Field of Legal Practice, 20 VISUAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 143 (2007).
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The Federal Rules of Evidence dictate that judges can exclude evi-
dence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
unfair prejudice, which—according to the advisory notes to this rule—
is “an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”3 Judges are,
therefore, forced to play armchair psychologists. They are left to their
assumptions about whether (and how) jurors’ emotional responses
might affect their decision-making in prejudicial ways. These assump-
tions are largely untested, and many are contradicted by psychological
science that demonstrates how emotions affect decision making.4 De-
spite the pervasiveness of emotionally disturbing evidence in court,
the psychological empirical literature investigating its effects on legal
judgments is relatively small—and focused almost entirely on criminal
cases.
In this Article, we review psychological theory and experiments that
investigate the impact of emotionally evocative evidence on mock ju-
rors’ decision making in criminal and civil cases. We also present an
experiment designed to investigate how mock jurors’ emotional re-
sponses to emotionally evocative evidence in a civil case (i.e., a grue-
some image of a plaintiff’s injury) are related to how they evaluate
other evidence in the case and, in turn, their ultimate verdict and dam-
age award decisions. In Part I, we review background on psychological
theory and experiments that explain how mock jurors’ emotional re-
sponses to evidence might affect how they process evidence and reach
decisions in general. Part I also discusses all previous experiments in-
vestigating the impact of gruesome images on mock jurors’ decision
making, specifically. In Part II, we describe the methodology of our
experiment. In Part III, we discuss and explain the results of our
study. Finally, in Part IV, we identify important future directions for
research regarding the role of emotion in civil legal decision making.
I. BACKGROUND
The judge in a case is responsible for deciding what evidence is ad-
mitted by determining whether the probative value of a piece of evi-
dence is not outweighed by any unfair prejudice.5 In Old Chief v.
United States, the Court defined unfair prejudice as “the capacity of
3. FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1972 Proposed Rules.
4. Susan Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The Cognitive Science
of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1003, 1025 (2015); Jessica
M. Salerno & Bette Bottoms, Emotional Evidence and Jurors’ Judgments: The Promise of
Neuroscience for Informing Psychology and Law, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 273, 282 (2009).
5. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declar-
ing guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.”6 Although there are no specific types of evidence that are
categorically considered unfairly prejudicial, emotionally evocative
evidence is the most common type of potentially prejudicial evidence.7
One type of emotionally evocative evidence that courts commonly
deal with is gruesome photographs that depict bodily injuries that are
graphic and likely to elicit disgust. These photographs are particularly
difficult for courts to deal with because they can be highly probative;
for example, informing injury severity by depicting the details of inju-
ries for which a plaintiff is seeking damages. These photographs, when
graphic and gruesome, also commonly rouse emotions in such a way
that can create a risk of unfair prejudice. When courts encounter this
type of evidence, they must balance the probative nature of the evi-
dence against the risk of unfair prejudice.8 However, courts will typi-
cally admit photographs if they deem them relevant, even if the
photographs are likely to prejudice the jury.9 For example, in State v.
Bocharski, the defendant was accused of murdering his neighbor with
a knife.10 At trial, the prosecutors sought to admit six photographs of
the victim’s fatal injuries.11 The defendant argued that the photo-
graphs were inflammatory and unduly prejudicial. The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting four of the photographs because these photographs were
relevant to the extent of the injuries and the manner of death.12 The
court also decided that, although the other two photographs were not
relevant, the error in including them was harmless because they would
not have biased the jury any further than the four acceptable photo-
graphs that they had seen.13
Similar to criminal cases, relevant gruesome photographs are often
admitted in civil cases despite the risk of prejudice. For example, in
Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Von Haden, the plaintiff offered photographs
showing his injuries and a bloodstained construction crane that the
6. 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (citing 1 J. Weinstein, M. Berger & J. McLaughlin, WEINSTEIN’S
EVIDENCE ¶ 403[03] (1996)).
7. FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1972 Proposed Rules.
8. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 173.
9. State v. Mohr, 106 Ariz. 402, 403 (1970).
10. 200 Ariz. 50 (2001).
11. Id. at 55.
12. Id. at 56–57. See also State v. Morris, 245 La. 175 (1963) (where the trial court correctly
admitted two black-and-white photographs but erred in admitting fifteen color photographs be-
cause the other photographs were irrelevant except to inflame the jury).
13. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. at 58.
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plaintiff argued contributed to his injuries.14 The defendant argued
that the probative information about the state of the equipment could
have been demonstrated with a photograph that did not contain the
plaintiff’s blood on the crane.15 The Supreme Court of Alabama held
that the photographs were properly admitted because they were rele-
vant to the issue of damages.16 Similarly, in Robinson v. F.W.
Woolworth & Co., the Court of Appeals of Louisiana held that the
trial court properly admitted photographs of the plaintiff’s burns be-
cause the photographs corroborated testimony about the severity of
the injury.17 Given that one can typically make a case for gruesome
photographs of a plaintiff’s injury providing probative information, it
becomes very important to determine the degree to which the nega-
tive emotions elicited by these photographs, such as anger and disgust,
can prejudice the jury to more effectively weigh against the photo-
graphs’ probative value.
Law journal articles that discuss gruesome photographs typically fo-
cus on their impact and treatment in criminal cases. Very few articles
discuss the impact of gruesome photographs in civil cases—and those
that do tend to focus on cases involving a death18 and explicitly note
the need for more research on the impact of gruesome photographs in
civil cases.19 Yet, psychological science can provide insight into how
negative emotions can affect decision-making processes in potentially
prejudicial ways that might apply to seeing gruesome photographs in
criminal and civil trials.
A. Psychological Science: The Impact of Negative Emotion
on Decision-Making Processes
Arousing negative emotions in jurors is not just an unfortunate, but
harmless byproduct of presenting evidence of plaintiff’s injuries. Ex-
periencing intense negative emotion can bias how people process in-
formation and make decisions. Gruesome photographic evidence of a
plaintiff’s injury is particularly likely to rouse anger (which people
14. 416 So. 2d 699 (Ala. 1982).
15. Id. at 701.
16. Id.
17. 420 So. 2d 737, 741 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
18. See, e.g., Amy S. Thomas, Utah Rule of Evidence 403 and Gruesome Photographs: Is A
Picture Worth Anything in Utah?, UTAH L. REV. 1131, 1149 (1996) (examining the effect of
Utah’s admissibility rule on prosecutors’ trial practice); Monica K. Miller et al., How Emotion
Affects the Trial Process, 92 JUDICATURE 56, 57 (2008) (discussing research on gruesome evi-
dence in criminal trials).
19. John Rafael Perez, Managing Fear-Based Derogation in Murder Trials, 43 J. LEGIS. 1, 18
(2016).
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tend to feel when they see an act of harm against someone that they
perceive to be intentional) and disgust (which people tend to feel
when they see a violation of a body).20 Psychological experiments
have demonstrated that feeling anger and disgust can create a need to
blame and punish someone to right the scales of justice for the harm
that they have witnessed21—the combination of anger and disgust is
particularly powerful.22 Social psychological research has demon-
strated several ways that this emotion-based need to blame and pun-
ish can then motivate and bias people to process other information in
a way that justifies blaming and punishing someone.23 Feeling angry
(even when the anger is completely unrelated to the decision being
made) biases people to judge the same act as more intentional relative
to other people judging the same act, but who were not made to feel
angry beforehand.24 Feeling anger and disgust is also associated with
feeling more certain in one’s own opinion than when feeling neutral,
which in turn can de-motivate people to process relevant information
deeply.25 This decreased motivation to process information deeply can
make people more reliant on heuristics (or cognitive “shortcuts”) and
stereotypes in their decision making.26 Further, several social psycho-
logical theories describe how rousing negative emotions might not de-
crease processing of all evidence equally, but instead might lead to a
biased or “directed” processing of other information that is in line
with their emotion-based need to blame and punish. More specifically,
activating negative emotions can instigate biased information process-
ing, such that people feeling negative emotion might selectively en-
code, retrieve, and interpret subsequent evidence in ways that are
20. See Pascale S. Russell & Roger Giner-Sorolla, Bodily Moral Disgust: What it is, How it is
Different from Anger, and Why it is an Unreasoned Emotion, 139 PSYCHOL. BULL. 328 (2013).
21. Hanah Chapman & Adam Anderson, Things Rank and Gross in Nature: A Review and
Synthesis of Moral Disgust, 139 PSYCHOL. BULL. 300, 317 (2013); e.g., Dacher Keltner, Phoebe C.
Ellsworth & Kari Edwards, Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social
Perception, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 740, 743 (1993); Catherine Molho, Joshua M.
Tybur, Ezgi Gu¨ler, Daniel Balliet & Wilhelm Hofmann, Disgust and Anger Relate to Different
Aggressive Responses to Moral Violations, 28 PYSCHOL. SCI. 609, 617 (2017).
22. See Jessica M. Salerno & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, The Interactive Effect of Anger and Dis-
gust on Moral Outrage and Judgments, 24 PYSCHOL. SCI. 2069 (2013).
23. Id.
24. See Karl Ask & Afroditi Pina, On Being Angry and Punitive: How Anger Alters Perception
of Criminal Intent, 2 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 494 (2011).
25. Craig A. Smith & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion, 48 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 813, 833 (1985); Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment
Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information
Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973, 974 (2001).
26. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Emotions, Arousal, and Stereotypic Judgments: A Heuristic
Model of Affect and Stereotyping, in AFFECT, COGNITION & STEREOTYPING 13 (1993).
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consistent with that negative emotion and the resulting need to blame
someone.27
This research suggests that if jurors are made to feel angry and dis-
gusted, it might motivate them to seek out information that justifies
blaming and punishing a defendant and ignore other information that
contradicts that motivation. In fact, social psychologists have de-
scribed this phenomenon as anger turning “‘intuitive scientists’ . . .
into ‘intuitive prosecutors’ . . . .”28 This social psychological research
has implications, specifically, for the potentially prejudicial impact of
presenting gruesome photographs. These theories and experiments
would support the prediction that the anger and disgust jurors might
feel after seeing graphic photographs of a plaintiff’s injury might cre-
ate a need to blame and punish, which could make them engage in a
prejudicial processing of other evidence to support ruling against the
defendant. More specifically, viewing the photographs might make the
jurors more disgusted and angry, which in turn might make them un-
consciously more likely to process or to rely on plaintiff evidence and
less likely to process or to rely on defense evidence, which in turn
would justify choosing a verdict for the plaintiff.
B. The Impact of Gruesome Photographs on
Mock Juror Decision Making
A growing number of mock jury experiments have demonstrated
that gruesome images can make mock jurors more conviction prone
and punitive in the criminal system.29 These experiments presented a
27. See Joseph P. Forgas, Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM), 117
PSYCHOL. BULL. 39 (1995); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control And The Psychology Of Blame,
126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 558 (2000); Dan Simon, Douglas M. Stenstrom & Stephen J. Read, The
Coherence Effect: Blending Cold And Hot Cognitions, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
369, 379 (2015); for application of these theories to juror decision making specifically, see
Bandes & Salerno, supra note 4, at 1026; Neal Feigenson & Jaihyun Park, Emotions and Attribu-
tions of Legal Responsibility and Blame: A Research Review, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 147–48
(2006); Salerno & Bottoms, supra note 4, at 287.
28. Julie H. Goldberg, Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Rage and Reason: The Psychol-
ogy of the Intuitive Prosecutor, 29 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 781, 782 (1999).
29. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger,
Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 196 (2006); Kevin Douglas, David
Lyon & James R. Ogloff, The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors’ Deci-
sions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 485, 492 (1997); Emily
R. Edwards & Karen E. Mottarella, Preserving the Right to a Fair Trial: An Examination of
Prejudicial Value of Visual and Auditory Evidence, 16 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 397, 397–414 (2014);
Remi Finkelstein & Marina Bastounis, The Effect of the Deliberation Process and Jurors’ Prior
Legal Knowledge on the Sentence: The Role of Psychological Expertise and Crime Scene Photo,
28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 426, 436 (2010); Kayo Matsuo & Yuji Itoh, Effects of Emotional Testimony
and Gruesome Photographs on Mock Jurors’ Decisions and Negative Emotions, 23 PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCHOL. & L. 85, 91 (2016); Jessica M. Salerno, Seeing Red: Disgust Reactions to Gruesome
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sample of mock jurors with the same case that includes information
regarding the victim’s injuries verbally (e.g., in a coroner or expert’s
testimony). The mock jurors were randomly assigned to either learn
of the injury via testimony only (i.e., the control condition) or to see
images of the victim’s injuries in addition to the verbal description. A
meta-analysis of these studies demonstrated that mock jurors who see
the photographs are significantly more likely to deliver more pro-
prosecution/plaintiff judgments than those who get the information
only verbally.30
Only three of these experiments, however, have tested this question
in the context of a civil case. One experiment found that viewing pho-
tographs of a girl who had been hit by a car and suffered a bleeding
head wound significantly increased liable verdicts relative to those
who learned the details about the injury but did not see the photo-
graphs.31 Another experiment found that viewing photographs of a
child who had fallen and had a contorted leg injury and was bleeding
profusely significantly increased the amount of damages awarded rela-
tive to those who learned the details about the injury but did not see
the photographs.32 The third study found that viewing graphic photo-
graphs of a plaintiff’s hand injury did not affect ratings of the defen-
dant’s negligence, although the photographs did increase the
percentage of jurors who were willing to award damages relative to
jurors who learned the details about the injury verbally, but did not
see the photographs.33 In addition to the scarcity of studies in the civil
realm, further experiments are needed: Two of these three studies
were conducted decades ago before the field was as cognizant of, and
had the resources to address, the unreliable nature of small sample
sizes and all three were conducted with undergraduate samples who
are less representative of actual jury pools.
Photographs in Color (But Not in Black and White) Increase Convictions, 23 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL’Y, & L. 336 (2017) [hereinafter Salerno 2017].
30. Rebecca H. Grady, Lauren Reiser, Robert J. Garcia, Christian Koeu & Nicholas Scurich,
Impact of Gruesome Photographic Evidence on Legal Decisions: A Meta-Analysis, 25 PSYCHIA-
TRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 503, 505–07 (2018).
31. David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Mock Juror Decision Making in a Civil
Negligence Trial: The Impact of Gruesome Evidence, Injury Severity, and Information Processing
Route, 18 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 439, 451 (2011).
32. David H. Whalen & Fletcher A. Blanchard, Effects of Photographic Evidence on Mock
Juror Judgement, 12 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 30, 30 (1982).
33. Edward Oliver & William Griffitt, Emotional Arousal and ‘Objective’ Judgment, 8 BULL.
PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y. 399, 400 (1976).
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C. The Effect of Gruesome Photographs on Verdicts:
Probative or Prejudicial?
In addition to addressing potential methodological limitations of
the previous three experiments, further research is needed to begin to
understand how and why these photographs are making people more
likely to render pro-prosecution/plaintiff verdicts. Very few studies
that investigate emotionally disturbing evidence—in both the criminal
and civil realms—have addressed the specific question that lawyers,
judges, and the legal system face: To what degree are jurors’ emo-
tional reactions to case evidence having a prejudicial impact on deci-
sions? It is not problematic if jurors are influenced by these
photographs through probative channels. Judges are not asked to
judge whether a photograph will influence jurors’ judgments—surely,
they assume they might if they are admitting them into court. They
need to determine how and why photographs influence jurors’ judg-
ments to judge whether the prejudicial effect of a particular photo-
graph outweighs its probative value.34
As noted in our review of basic social psychological theory and ex-
periments, one potentially prejudicial effect of viewing gruesome pho-
tographs is that they might bias jurors’ processing of other case
evidence in a way that supports their motivation to blame and punish
someone for the plaintiff’s injury.35 A few mock jury studies have pro-
vided evidence suggestive of emotionally evocative evidence having,
specifically, prejudicial effects on jurors’ decision-making processes.
One study found that exposure to a visual depiction of a crime scene
roused mock jurors’ emotions, which led them to set lower standards
of proof than those who did not see the visual depiction.36 As re-
viewed, mock jurors who are feeling angry (even when the anger is
completely unrelated to the case) are biased to judge the same action
as more intentional37 and more likely to rely on racial stereotypes
when choosing a verdict, relative to mock jurors who are not feeling
angry.38 Three experiments have demonstrated that viewing gruesome
photographs increase mock jurors’ anger or disgust, or both, and that
34. FED. R. EVID. 403.
35. See discussion supra Part I.A.
36. See generally Saul M. Kassin & David A. Garfield, Blood and Guts: General and Trial-
Specific Effects of Videotaped Crime Scenes on Mock Jurors, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1459
(1991).
37. See Ask & Pina, supra note 24.
38. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Lori A. Sheppard & Geoffrey P. Kramer, Negative Affect and
Social Judgment: The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness, 24 EUR. J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL.
45–62 (1994).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL213.txt unknown Seq: 10 21-APR-20 12:12
642 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:633
the degree to which they felt anger or disgust directly predicted a
greater likelihood of voting guilty in a case.39
Viewing gruesome photographs of a murder victim can bias how
mock jurors perceive other evidence in the case. Mock jurors who
were randomly assigned to view gruesome photographs of a murder
victim were less open to a strong (versus weak) defense case, relative
to those who heard about the victim’s injuries in verbal testimony
alone.40 More specifically, among mock jurors who only heard about
the victim’s injuries during testimony, those who heard a strong de-
fense case were significantly more likely to rate the defense’s evidence
as stronger and, in turn, were significantly less likely to vote guilty
relative to those who heard a weak defense case (as we would hope
jurors would do). In contrast, when mock jurors also saw gruesome
photographs of the murder victim, the impact of hearing a strong (ver-
sus weak) defense case on their perceptions of defense case strength
and verdicts was drastically reduced. That is, jurors became either less
attentive to or less willing to rely on a strong defense when their emo-
tions are roused by seeing gruesome photographs.
In even more recent ongoing work, we have found that viewing
gruesome photographs of a murder victim (versus hearing about the
details only verbally during testimony) motivates mock jurors to agree
more with prosecution arguments—even when we ask about evidence
and arguments that are completely unrelated to the photographs and
the victim’s injuries. Even more concerning, viewing the prosecution’s
gruesome photographs (versus not viewing them) made mock jurors
also agree less with defense testimony unrelated to the photographs,
which, in turn, made them more conviction prone.41 These studies
have demonstrated that presenting mock jurors with gruesome photo-
graphs of a victim’s injuries not only rouses jurors’ negative emotions,
but can prejudice them against a defendant by instigating a motivated
processing of the evidence that puts more weight on prosecution evi-
dence and less weight on defense evidence. Although this preliminary
work in the criminal realm suggests a psychological process that might
be at play in civil cases, no studies to our knowledge have attempted
to identify these potentially prejudicial effects of viewing emotionally
disturbing evidence in civil cases.
39. Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 31, at 454; Salerno 2017, supra note 29.
40. Salerno 2017, supra note 29, at 339.
41. Jessica M. Salerno, Hannah J. Phalen, Janice Nadler, Nicholas J. Schweitzer & Susan
Bandes, The impact of gruesome photographs and judicial instructions on jury decision making
(research in progress) (on file with author).
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II. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
We designed a mock jury experiment to address this gap by testing
whether viewing a graphic photograph of a plaintiff’s injuries would
affect mock jurors’ emotions, opinions about other unrelated case evi-
dence, and ultimately their liability verdicts and damage awards in a
civil case. We recruited 223 online participants from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk to participate, who read a summary of evidence from
a real civil case.42 We excluded 12 (5.4%) of participants for failing
manipulation checks assessing whether they paid enough attention to
correctly report that they had seen either no photograph of the vic-
tim’s leg, a photograph of the victim’s leg in black and white or in
color. The remaining 211 participants were 47% women; 81% White,
6.6% African American, 6.2% Other, 5% Asian, and 1% American
Indian or Alaska Native; and had an age range of 19 to 72 years old
(Mage = 38, SD = 11.5).
We presented all mock jurors with the same case evidence in which
the plaintiff’s vehicle veered off of the highway and struck a guardrail
end treatment designed and manufactured by Springhill Industries,
Inc. (the defendant). After the initial impact, the guardrail broke away
from the end treatment and penetrated the front driver side headlight
and speared the plaintiff’s foot, which resulted in severing the plain-
tiff’s leg. The plaintiff was trapped until emergency responders cut
through the roof of his vehicle, freed him, and transported him to the
closest hospital. Now, the plaintiff reports suffering both real and
phantom pain and is no longer able to live on his own.
All parties stipulated that a piece of the guardrail severed the plain-
tiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued Springhill Industries, Inc. (we changed the
name of the actual company in the case), arguing that they designed a
faulty end treatment that caused his injury. Springhill Industries ar-
gued that the end treatment was not faulty and that the plaintiff is
fully at fault. The participants read summaries of the opening and
closing statements, and testimony from plaintiff witnesses (i.e., the
plaintiff, a Springhill employee, an accident reconstruction expert, a
medical expert, and an economics expert who suggested damages) and
42. Mechanical-Turk samples have been found to be more demographically diverse than more
traditional samples (e.g., college students or online community member samples), and are con-
sidered to be a legitimate source of quality data. See generally Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang
& Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-
Quality, Data?, 6 PERSPECTIVES PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler &
Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DE-
CISION MAKING 411 (2010) (including for psychology and law studies, specifically Krin Irvine,
David Hoffman, & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Law and Psychology Grows Up, Goes Online, and
Replicates, 15 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 331 (2018)).
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defense witnesses (i.e., the CEO of Springhill Industries, a medical
expert, and a reconstruction expert). The issue that the mock jurors’
liability verdicts should have hinged on was whether the plaintiff’s in-
jury was caused by the company knowingly deciding to cut corners
and save money by decreasing the size of the guardrail component,
which the plaintiff claims they knew had deleterious safety implica-
tions. Given that both sides stipulated that the plaintiff lost his leg and
that the accident was the cause of the severed leg, a photograph of the
leg should not have had non-redundant probative value regarding the
issue at hand (i.e., whether the company knowingly decided to cut cor-
ners by decreasing the size of the guardrail despite the safety
implications).
The mock jurors were randomly assigned to read the case evidence
summaries and view neutral photographs of the car and guardrail
before the accident along with either (a) no photographs of the vic-
tim’s injury (i.e., the control condition), (b) the addition of a photo-
graph of medical professionals working on the plaintiff’s severed leg
on a table in color, or (c) the addition of the same photograph of the
plaintiff’s severed leg in black and white. We included a black-and-
white condition because previous research regarding a criminal trial
demonstrated that presenting gruesome photographs in black and
white eliminated the effect that the same photographs in color had on
verdicts.43 The photograph of the plaintiff’s leg was presented once in
the context of the plaintiff’s testimony, once in the context of the med-
ical professional’s testimony, and once during the plaintiff’s closing
statement. This case and photograph was from a real case that was
chosen, in part, because the severity and cause of the plaintiff’s injury
was clear without seeing a photograph, in that both sides stipulated
that the leg had been severed and that it was a result of the guardrail
end treatment. Thus, the photographs had limited probative value for
liability judgments beyond other redundant evidence. Further, we
held the probative information as constant as possible by including the
details of the plaintiff’s injuries in all versions of the medical expert’s
testimony for all participants—even those who were in the control
condition with no photographs of the leg.
After viewing the trial evidence, mock jurors read pattern civil jury
instructions. Next, they completed several measures, described below.
We focused primarily on liability judgments because the photograph
of the plaintiff’s leg arguably should not have had a probative impact
on liability judgments given that both sides stipulated to details about
43. Salerno 2017, supra note 29, at 336.
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the plaintiff’s injury (i.e., losing his leg). The measures the mock jurors
completed were as follows:
(a) Liability Verdict: Participants chose whether they found in favor
of the plaintiff or the defendant.
(b) Damage awards: Participants indicated the amount of full dam-
ages that they would award to the plaintiff in dollars. We did
not specify what type of damages or different categories of
damages. They were then asked whether they believed that
amount to be “Basically nothing,” “Low,” “Medium,” or
“High.” They were then asked to indicated the amount of puni-
tive damages that they would award to the plaintiff in dollars,
and were again asked whether they believed that amount to be
Basically nothing, Low, Medium, or High.
(c) Assessment of unrelated evidence: Participants indicated the ex-
tent to which they agreed with a set of five inferences drawn
from plaintiff evidence and then a set of five inferences drawn
from the defendant’s evidence on a 7-point scale ranging from
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Care was taken to ensure
that none of the arguments were relevant to the photographs of
the plaintiff’s severed leg (e.g., The defendant knew the 4- inch
SET-7—a component of the guardrail—was unsafe), such that
viewing the photographs should have had no probative effect on
the extent to which they agreed with any of these unrelated case
facts.44 We created two scales. One assessing agreement with
unrelated plaintiff evidence (∝ = .82) and the other assessing
agreement with unrelated defendant’s evidence (∝ = .68).
(d) Emotional reactions to the plaintiff’s injury: Participants indi-
cated the extent to which they felt the following emotions while
reviewing evidence about the plaintiff’s injuries:
(1) disgust (4-item scale, ∝ = .88), (2) anger (3-item scale, ∝ =
.93), (3) fear (single item), (4) sympathy toward the victim (3-
item scale, ∝ = .87), and (5) sadness (3-item scale, ∝ = .76). The
ratings were completed on 5-point scales ranging from Not at all
to Very much.
A. Hypotheses
First, we hypothesized that viewing a gruesome photograph of a
plaintiff’s injury would rouse negative emotions, which, in turn, would
increase the likelihood that mock jurors would choose a liable verdict.
44. See app.
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Although we measured all negative emotions that could feasibly be
roused by viewing the photograph of the plaintiff’s injury (i.e., anger,
disgust, sadness, fear, and sympathy), our previous research45 led us to
predict that seeing the graphic photograph of a severed leg would be
particularly likely to increase mock jurors’ level of disgust and, in turn,
liability verdicts.
Second, we hypothesized a psychological explanation for why or
how the increased disgust (and any other negative emotions) elicited
by viewing the photograph might be associated with increased liability
verdicts. We predicted that the disgust resulting from viewing the
gruesome photograph of the plaintiff’s injury might be associated with
biased or selective reliance on other evidence to support a liable ver-
dict—even arguments in the case that are entirely unrelated to the
plaintiff’s injury depicted in the photograph. More specifically, this in-
crease in disgust, in turn, would (a) increase agreement with plaintiff’s
evidence that is unrelated to the injury depicted in the photo and (b)
decrease agreement with defendant’s evidence that is unrelated to the
injury, which would both ultimately result in a greater likelihood of a
liable verdict.
We had hypothesized that presenting the gruesome photograph in
black and white might eliminate these effects but found no statistically
significant differences between mock jurors who saw black and white
photographs and color photographs in terms of their emotional reac-
tions or verdicts. Thus, we combined participants from these two con-
ditions into one group and now present results from mock jurors who
saw the gruesome leg photograph in black and white or color com-
pared to mock jurors who saw no gruesome leg photograph.
Third, we tested whether the gruesome photograph of the leg af-
fected mock jurors’ damage awards. We tested whether viewing the
gruesome photograph of the leg increased damage awards relative to
reading about details of the injury verbally.
III. EMPIRICAL STUDY RESULTS
A. Hypothesis 1
First, we tested whether seeing the gruesome leg photograph would
increase negative emotions, which, in turn, would result in a greater
likelihood of a liable verdict.46 We conducted a series of mediation
analyses to test whether viewing the gruesome leg photograph (versus
not viewing the photograph) had a significant indirect effect on liable
45. See Salerno 2017, supra note 29.
46. See infra fig.1.
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verdicts through anger, disgust, fear, sadness, or sympathy. We report
all indirect effects, which are considered to be statistically significant if
their associated confidence intervals do not include zero. We also re-
port the direction and significance of each path in the model in Figure
1.
FIGURE 1. Indirect Effects of a Gruesome Photograph on Verdicts
Through Emotional Reaction47
47. Indirect effects of viewing a gruesome photograph of the plaintiff’s leg on the likelihood of
choosing a liable verdict through mock jurors’ emotional reactions to the evidence, relative to
not viewing the gruesome photograph. Significant indirect effects are indicated by confidence
intervals (CI) that do not include zero and are denoted in bold. Significant paths are indicated by
p-values less than .05 and denoted by solid lines; non-significant paths are denoted by dotted
lines.
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The only significant indirect effect of viewing the gruesome photo-
graph of the plaintiff’s leg on the likelihood of choosing a liable ver-
dict operated through disgust. More specifically, viewing the
gruesome leg photograph significantly increased the level of disgust
the mock jurors reported, and the increased disgust was significantly
associated with an increased likelihood of finding the defendant liable
for the injury. Despite the fact that the nature and severity of the
plaintiff’s injury was not in dispute, and given that both sides stipu-
lated that the leg had been severed as a result of the car accident, the
disgust that the mock jurors felt about actually seeing the severed leg
(relative to only reading about the details in the medical examiner’s
testimony) predicted an increased likelihood finding the defendant to
be liable.
It is important to note that although none of the other negative
emotions explained the effect of the gruesome photograph on liable
verdicts, it is not the case that mock jurors’ other emotions were unre-
lated to their verdicts. The significant and positive pathways between
all negative emotions and liable verdicts48 show that all negative emo-
tions were positively related to the increased likelihood of a liable ver-
dict. In other words, although the gruesome photograph did not
significantly increase the other negative emotions, to the degree that
the mock jurors did feel anger, sadness, fear, and sympathy about the
plaintiff’s injuries they were also more likely to choose a liable verdict.
B. Hypothesis 2
Our second hypothesis predicted that the negative emotional reac-
tion to the gruesome leg photograph would increase liability verdicts,
in part, due to biased and selective reliance on other evidence unre-
lated to the plaintiff’s injury to justify a liable verdict. Given that dis-
gust was the only negative emotion that significantly increased as a
result of seeing the gruesome photograph of the plaintiff’s leg, we fo-
cused only on disgust.49 We conducted a serial mediation model that
tested whether seeing a gruesome photograph (versus not seeing the
gruesome photograph) of the plaintiff’s leg would increase disgust,
which, in turn, would significantly (a) increase agreement with plain-
tiff’s arguments that were unrelated to the victim’s injury, and (b) de-
crease agreement with defendant’s arguments unrelated to the
48. See supra fig.1.
49. We did, however, run additional models similar to Figure 2 that substituted each of the
other negative emotions for disgust and found that all models were not significant. See infra fig.2.
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plaintiff’s injury, both of which would ultimately be associated with an
increased likelihood of choosing a liable verdict.50
FIGURE 2. The Indirect Effects of the Gruesome Photograph
on Verdicts Through Disgust and Assessment
of Unrelated Arguments51
b = .48,
p = .003
b = .35,
p = .0004
b = 2.24,
p < .00001
b = .48,
p = .003
b = -.19,
p = .005
b = -2.76,
p < .00001
Mindirecteffect = .26, 95% CI [.05, .62]
Liable Verdict
Agreement with
Defense’s
Unrelated
Arguments
Agreement with
Plaintiff’s
Unrelated
Arguments
Disgust
Liable VerdictDisgust
Gruesome Leg
Photo
(vs. no Photo)
Gruesome Leg
Photo
(vs. no Photo)
Mindirecteffect = .35, 95% CI [.09, .76]
We found that the indirect effects of the gruesome photograph on
liable verdicts through disgust and both agreement with unrelated
plaintiff’s and defendant’s arguments were significant. The first signifi-
cant indirect effect revealed that viewing a gruesome leg photograph
significantly increased disgust, which, in turn, predicted agreeing more
with plaintiff’s arguments that were unrelated to the plaintiff’s injury.
This, in turn, was associated with a greater likelihood of finding for
the plaintiff. The second indirect effect revealed that viewing a grue-
some leg photograph significantly increased disgust, which, in turn,
predicted agreeing less with defendant’s arguments that were unre-
lated to the plaintiff’s injury. This, in turn, was also associated with
greater likelihood of finding for the plaintiff. In summary, the disgust
resulting from seeing a gruesome image of a plaintiff’s severed leg was
associated with a prejudicial pattern of assessing other evidence—
even evidence that was completely unrelated to the plaintiff’s injury
that was depicted in the photograph—in a direction consistent with
50. See infra fig.2.
51. Indirect effects of viewing a gruesome photograph of the plaintiff’s leg on the likelihood of
choosing a liable verdict through mock jurors’ disgust and agreement with unrelated plaintiff and
defense arguments, relative to not viewing the gruesome photograph of the plaintiff’s leg.
Significant indirect effects are indicated by confidence intervals (CI) that do not include zero
and are denoted in bold. Significant paths are indicated by p-values less than .05 and denoted by
solid lines; non-significant paths are denoted by dotted lines.
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supporting a liable verdict. That is, the gruesome photograph made
people disgusted, which was related to a biased assessment of both
plaintiff’s and defendant’s evidence in a direction supportive of a lia-
ble verdict.
It should be noted, however, that although we found robust evi-
dence for this biased psychological process, the overall effect of this
specific gruesome photograph on liability verdicts in this study was
not large. As reported, we did find evidence that the gruesome photo-
graph significantly increased mock jurors’ disgust, and that disgust
level was associated with a biased assessment of evidence unrelated to
the photograph that can result in biased verdicts. However, when we
do not take disgust and assessment of unrelated evidence into account
in the analysis, we do not find that viewing the gruesome photograph
of the leg, relative to not seeing the photograph, had an overall signifi-
cant effect on liability verdicts, c2(1, N = 211) = .11, p = .430. This
pattern of results suggests that to the degree that gruesome photo-
graphs elicit disgust, they can instigate a prejudicial assessment of
plaintiff’s and defendant’s evidence to support a liable verdict for the
plaintiff—but this one particular photograph did not have a large im-
pact on verdicts in this case.
C. Damage Awards
We also tested whether the gruesome photograph of the leg might
have had a probative effect on damage awards—that is, it might have
conveyed information about how severe the injury was more im-
pactfully than just a verbal description. This might have made mock
jurors who chose a liable verdict award higher damages than those
who did not see the photograph. We found, however, that viewing the
gruesome photograph of the plaintiff’s severed leg did not have a sta-
tistically significant effect on mock jurors’ suggested overall damage
awards, F(1, 151) = 3.01, p = .085, or punitive damages, F(1, 127) = .50,
p = .480. Viewing the gruesome photograph of the plaintiff’s severed
leg also did not have a significant impact on their perceived level (i.e.,
basically nothing, low, medium, high) of overall damage awards, F(1,
151) = .01, p = .907, or punitive damages, F(1, 127) = .53, p = .468. See
tbl.1 for descriptive statistics.52
52. We identified one statistical outlier among (a) overall awards ($5,000,000,000), which we
recoded to be the same as the next highest overall award ($20,000,000), and (b) punitive awards
($3,000,000,000), which we recoded to be the same as the next highest punitive award
($50,000,000). These two awards were suggested by the same participant. Analyzing the data
without recoding this outlier (i.e., the original awards) did not change the results.
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TABLE 1. Mean (SD) Award Amounts as a Function of
Whether Participants Saw a Gruesome Photo of
the Plaintiff’s Severed Leg
 
Dollar Awards General Levels of Awards 
No Gruesome 
Photo 
Gruesome 
Photo 
No Gruesome 
Photo 
Gruesome  
Photo 
Overall  
Awards 
$7,122,305 
($3,836,375) 
n = 52 
$5,994,721 
($3,792,553)
n = 101 
3.13 
(.74) 
n = 52 
3.15 
(.57) 
n = 101 
Punitive  
Damages 
$5,176,000 
($10,292,078)
n = 45 
$4,040,803 
($7,671,401)
n = 84 
2.98 
(.66) 
n = 45 
2.88 
(.75) 
n = .84 
Note. Only participants who chose a liable verdict were asked the damage award measures.
General level of awards were assessed on a 4-point scale (1 = Basically nothing, 2 = Low, 3 =
Medium, 4 = High).
IV. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although this study cannot speak to the probative value of any
given photograph in any given case, it calls into question the assump-
tion that viewing gruesome photographs is harmless. Instead, the re-
sults identify a potentially prejudicial effect of viewing gruesome
photographs of plaintiffs’ injuries: the disgust that results from view-
ing these photographs can turn jurors from “‘intuitive scientists’ . . .
into ‘intuitive prosecutors’ . . . .”53 More specifically, their disgust re-
action to the gruesome photographs can (potentially unconsciously)
motivate them to put more weight on plaintiff’s evidence and less
weight on defendant’s evidence—even when that evidence that is en-
tirely unrelated and irrelevant to the photograph—which then justifies
them choosing a verdict for the plaintiff. This indirect effect of grue-
some photographs on verdicts emerged despite the fact that all mock
jurors saw the same evidence (excepting the gruesome photograph),
that all jurors learned the details of the injury in testimony even when
they did not see the photograph, and that both sides stipulated that
the leg was severed. Thus, this effect is likely due to the negative emo-
tional reaction to seeing the photograph, rather than merely learning
more information about the injury.
Further, seeing the gruesome photograph of the leg did not appear
to hold probative value about the severity of the injury given that see-
ing the photograph did not affect mock jurors’ damage awards. Al-
53. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 782.
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though mock jurors assigned similar damage awards whether or not
they saw the photograph, the gruesome photograph was related to a
biased assessment of the evidence in support of a plaintiff verdict.
Therefore, judges might want to think about whether the information
depicted in gruesome photographs can be presented to jurors in a less
prejudicial format, such as through verbal testimony from witnesses.
It should be noted, however, that although the gruesome photo-
graph elicited disgust and instigated biased assessment of the other
evidence that affected liability verdicts, its impact on verdicts in this
case was not large. It is difficult to draw conclusions from one study
about why that is the case. Of note, among the four extant experi-
ments regarding the impact of gruesome photographs on civil judg-
ments (including this one), the two experiments that showed young
people’s injuries that included their entire body in the photograph
demonstrated a statistically significant effect of the gruesome photo-
graph on liability verdicts or damages.54 In contrast, the two experi-
ments that showed a hand or leg injury without the victim’s full body
(and did not involve children) showed more mixed results (i.e., the
photographs affecting some judgments, but not others).55 This sug-
gests the possibility that gruesome photographs depicting the victim’s
entire body, head, or face might have a bigger impact than photo-
graphs that do not. It is also possible that gruesome photographs de-
picting children are more impactful than photographs that do not. It is
possible that seeing only one photograph, as the participants in this
study saw, is less impactful than seeing several photographs. More
broadly, it suggests that more research must be done to determine
when gruesome photographs have potential to affect legal judgments
in civil cases in prejudicial ways. Next, we describe several fruitful ave-
nues for future research on this issue.
A. Future Directions
1. Emotionally Evocative Evidence in Civil Cases
In addition to the need for more studies investigating whether the
effects of gruesome photographs on criminal judgments generalize to
civil cases, the heavy focus on criminal cases represents a missed op-
portunity to gain insight into factors unique to civil cases. First, civil
cases present unique types of evidence that might affect jurors emo-
tionally, which are not a part of criminal trials. For example, attorneys
often present “Day-in-the-Life” videos depicting the tragic conse-
54. See discussion supra Part I.B.
55. Id.
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quences of a plaintiff’s injury in their everyday life to educate the jury
in civil cases. These videos have roused debate, however, about the
potential prejudicial impact of these videos and the implications for
admissibility.56 These videos have the potential to elicit anger from
seeing an individual suffering from intense harm, sadness from wit-
nessing the plaintiff’s profound losses, disgust from seeing graphic de-
pictions of the plaintiff’s injuries, and sympathy for the plaintiff’s
plight. Yet, similar to gruesome photographs, the judge is left to guess
at how intense these emotional reactions might be and—even more
difficult—predict the impact that those emotional reactions might
have on mock jurors’ decision-making processes. Perhaps the most
similar form of evidence that has been investigated experimentally are
victim impact statements, which are allowed in the sentencing phase
of a capital murder trial (but not typically allowed in the guilt phase).
Experimental studies have demonstrated that mock jurors are more
likely to choose the death penalty when they hear a victim impact
statement relative to those who hear the same evidence without the
statement.57 However, these studies have not tackled the degree to
which the effect of this kind of evidence is operating through proba-
tive versus prejudicial channels.58
In addition to civil cases involving unique forms of evidence, jurors
in civil cases are instructed to employ a lower burden of proof, which
might make the impact of their emotions on their confidence and final
judgments even stronger than in criminal trials that require a much
56. See Jane A. Kalinski, Jurors at the Movies: Day-in-the-Life Videos as Effective Evidentiary
Tool or Unfairly Prejudicial Device, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 789 (1993); Chilton D. Varner &
James M. McGee, Worth a Thousand Words: The Admissibility of Day-in-the-Life Videos, TORT
& INS. L.J. 175, 176 (1999); Douglas A. Graham & Daryl J. Lapp, Day-in-the-Life Videos: Evolv-
ing Arguments on Their Making and Use on Trial, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 574 (1991); Tricia E.
Habert, Day in the Life and Surveillance Videos: Discovery of Videotaped Evidence in Personal
Injury Suits, 97 DICK. L. REV. 305 (1992).
57. Ray Paternoster & Jerome Deise, A Heavy Thumb on the Scale: The Effect of Victim
Impact Evidence on Capital Decision Making, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 129, 150 (2011); see also Lynne
Forsterlee, G. B. Fox, Robert Forsterlee & Robert Ho, The Effects of a Victim Impact Statement
and Gender on Juror Information Processing in a Criminal Trial: Does the Punishment Fit the
Crime?, 39 AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOL. 57 (2004); Mila G. McGowan & Bryan Myers, Who is the
Victim Anyway? The Effects of Bystander Victim Impact Statements on Mock Juror Sentencing
Decisions, 19 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 357, 366 (2004); Bryan Myers & Jack Arbuthnot, The Effects
Of Victim Impact Evidence On The Verdicts And Sentencing Judgments Of Mock Jurors, 29 J.
OFFENDER REHABILITATION 95, 108 (1999); Narina Nun˜ez, Dori Egan-Wright, Andre Kehn &
Bryan Myers, 4th International Congress of Psychology and Law, Miami, Florida: Impact of
different methods of victim impact statement delivery at capital trials: Emotionality of statements
and its impact on sentencing decisions (Mar. 2011).
58. For an exception see Paternoster & Deise, supra note 55. This study did find that the
increase in death penalty verdicts was explained, in part, by feelings of sympathy and empathy
for the victim and the victim’s family.
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higher burden of proof. Further, civil jurors are asked to make en-
tirely different judgments than criminal jurors—some of which might
be relevant to emotions, such as quantifying emotional pain and
suffering.
2. Interventions to Mitigate the Prejudicial Impact of Gruesome
Photographs
There might be interventions that can mitigate the prejudicial im-
pact of emotionally disturbing evidence without having to exclude
photographs that might have probative value. We have found that see-
ing the same gruesome photographs in black and white makes mock
jurors less conviction-prone than mock jurors who see the same pho-
tographs in color, specifically because they induce less disgust.59 We
did not find in this study, however, that the black and white photo-
graphs elicited less disgust than did color photographs. This interven-
tion should be tested further in the context of a case that has more
than one gruesome photograph, as well as photographs that might be
more likely to have a larger effect—such as photographs that depict
the victim’s entire body or depict child victims. We have also found
preliminary support for the possibility that judicial instructions draw-
ing mock jurors’ awareness to the potentially biasing effect of the pho-
tographs might eliminate the impact of viewing gruesome
photographs (versus only verbal descriptions) on convictions in crimi-
nal cases.60 This needs to be tested in the realm of civil cases.
3. Judges’ Admissibility Decisions
An important future direction would be to focus on judges, rather
than jurors. There are no data, to our knowledge, on judges’ admissi-
bility decisions: Are gruesome photographs challenged often in pre-
trial hearings? If so, do judges tend to err on the side of admitting
them because they believe jurors can regulate their emotional re-
sponses? How often do attorneys challenge the photographs and pre-
sent alternative modes of presentation (e.g., black and white
photographs, diagrams, verbal testimony)? And, when defense attor-
neys do challenge the photographs, how often do judges rule in their
favor? Further, testing interventions to help judges make admissibility
decisions would be helpful.
Existing research has focused on providing judges with knowledge
and insight about the potentially prejudicial effect of emotional evi-
59. Salerno 2017, supra note 29, at 337–38.
60. Salerno et al., supra note 41.
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dence, which they can then weigh against the probative value they
believe that piece of evidence holds. Even if judges knew exactly how
much probative value and how much prejudicial impact a given piece
of emotionally evocative evidence had, how do they then go about
quantifying and weighing the two against each other to reach a cate-
gorical decision about whether it should be admitted or not? Now that
we know more about the potentially prejudicial effects of viewing
gruesome photographs, it is important to investigate how to weigh
them against the photographs’ probative value, as well as testing po-
tential decision aids to help judges quantify and weigh their prejudi-
cial effects against their probative value.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL213.txt unknown Seq: 24 21-APR-20 12:12
656 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:633
APPENDIX
FIGURE 3. Assessment of Unrelated Evidence
